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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines the evolution of the Ethiopian cut flower industry, illus-
trating how rapidly a potential comparative advantage can be realised. But the
question is to what extent a country benefits from this in the long run, if foreign
direct investment is the principal driving force. Will the new industry become an
enclave, or will it be accompanied by a process of building local capabilities,
a process which we denominate endogenisation? A value chain framework is
used to analyse the industry and to develop a number of indicators on the
development direction. The cut flower industry in Ethiopia is characterised by a
dominant role of Dutch foreign investors, Dutch trade auctions which dominate
the export trade, and the Dutch development cooperation which plays an
important role in the development of the sector. This raises the question to what
extent this triple role of the Dutch contributes to endogenisation or to enclave
formation.
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We conclude that endogenisation is a two-way process. It depends both on
the degree to which FDI has an interest to draw on domestic firms, enter into
relationships and share technologies ; and on the interest and ability of domestic
firms to take up such opportunities, and on the creation of supporting institutions
and infrastructures to make this take-up possible. The latter rests largely with
government. Endogenisation is taking place to some extent and at a very incipient
stage. Dutch FDI has little direct interest to share technologies, but there is joint
collective action on non-core activities, notably transport, which constitutes the
largest item in the total cost. Dutch cooperative flower auctions are an open and
vital trade channel giving Ethiopian flower growers access to international mar-
kets. The Ethiopian government has promoted the industry, making available
land and low cost finance ; and with the assistance of Dutch bilateral cooperation
it is creating trade standards and supporting knowledge institutions to train skilled
staff. The main challenge is Ethiopian entrepreneurship: many are attracted by
the high growth and profitability of the industry and can run a business in
Ethiopia, but lack the technical competence to meet growing competition in the
industry.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in economic development is a
controversial one. Increasingly, a view is emerging that the developmental
significance of FDI depends both on the type and behaviour of FDI, and
also on the capabilities of local firms in the recipient country (Lall &
Narula 2004). Especially in the case of poor countries, there is often a
paradox: there is a great need for investment and innovation, employment
creation and export, but in the absence of local capabilities, FDI in a
particular sector is likely to become an enclave – generating direct
employment but with little positive and sustainable effects spilling over
onto domestic firms. A central question is therefore to what extent the
expansion of FDI in a sector is accompanied by a process of building
local capabilities. This we call endogenisation, defined as the progressive
development of local capabilities and local control of a new export base
that has initially been shaped by external factors and forces.
In the last five years, the floriculture sector of Ethiopia has been
expanding rapidly. Many domestic and foreign investors have entered it.
The Dutch in particular participate vigorously in several parts of the cut
flower value chain: (1) in production, Dutch growers were responsible in
2007 for 37% of the total production for export (478 million stems – figures
which underestimate their role, as they exclude the exported output of
joint ventures with Ethiopian growers ; (2) in trade, two thirds of the total
Ethiopian export went in the same year to the Dutch market via its two
auctions, VBA and FloraHolland; and, last but not least, (3) Dutch
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development cooperation plays a critical role in the establishment of
key institutions for Ethiopian flower industry. Since Ethiopia is one of the
world’s poorest countries, and has in the past had low participation in
global FDI, this is an interesting case through which to examine the extent
of endogenisation.
This paper has three aims: (a) to examine the evolution of the Ethiopian
cut flower industry ; (b) to examine the degree to which this development
moves in the direction of endogenisation or enclave formation; and
(c) to discuss the triple role of Dutch actors in this process.
Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the central analytical concepts.
Section 3 examines the evolution of the Ethiopian cut flower industry,
and Section 4 looks at different segments of the value chain and the
position of Ethiopian and Dutch actors therein. Section 5 briefly recounts
the developmental impact of this new industry, while Section 6 draws
conclusions about the development direction, and assesses the triple role of
the Dutch.
F D I , E N D O G E N I S A T I O N O R E N C L A V E F O R M A T I O N : A V A L U E
C H A I N P E R S P E C T I V E
The value chain framework provides a helpful tool through which to
examine the effects of FDI in a country, and the direction of development
in the industry concerned. The value or production chain is ‘a trans-
actionally linked sequence of functions in which each stage adds value to
the process of production of goods and services ’ (Dicken 2003: 7). The
framework shows how each functional element in the production
sequence involves transactions, and depends on technological and other
inputs, including production technology and related research and devel-
opment, and also transport logistics and communication processes. These
may be provided by firms themselves or by other private and public
actors. A production chain is embedded in a financial system that
finances investments and recurrent transactions. Firms coordinate
these production and transaction sequences internally or with other
firms in various ways. In addition to both foreign and domestic firms active
in particular value adding activities, institutions and institutional
arrangements surround and support the functioning of the chain. These
are developed by a variety of actors, including technology, human
resource development (HRD), research and development (R&D), trans-
port and communication, the system that finances transactions, and
institutions concerned with coordination, regulation and control of the
chain.
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Regulation helps to reduce coordination problems and may be under-
taken by firms themselves, their associations or by government. Value
chain framework shows the complexity of a particular production–
transaction sequence (functional interdependence). How various actors
handle this complexity is the central issue of value chain governance.
Kaplinsky (2000) identified three aspects of governance, namely legislative,
judicial and executive governance, which may be exercised by public
or private actors within or external to the chain. Last but not least,
geography plays a role in value chain analysis, not only because of the
spatial extension of chains but also because of economic differentiation
between production and transaction locations.
Many studies focus on private actors internal to the chain, especially
the lead firms and their role in chain governance. Producer-driven and
buyer-driven chains are characterised by a lead firm in production and in
trading respectively (Gereffi 1994; Gereffi et al. 2001). Gibbon (2001)
identified a so-called trader-driven chain that often applies to agricultural
commodities. Dolan and Humphrey (2000) illustrate the power of retailers
in the way they influence and shape the governance of fresh vegetables
chains from Africa to UK supermarkets.
Other actors who play a role in the development of particular
value chains are governments and NGOs. Government policy plays an
important role in the financial system in which a chain is embedded,
especially through the provision of particular credit lines or guarantees,
and through banking and FDI regulation. Furthermore, governments are
often directly or indirectly responsible for the provision of transport and
communication infrastructure. Through education and R&D policies,
they can stimulate research in technologies and human resources devel-
opment relevant to a particular industry. Through industrial policies,
governments can provide important complementary support. Last but not
least, public regulation of international trade and environmental standards
has a direct bearing on the development of new export chains. In a similar
vein, NGOs can play a role either through voluntary regulation or
through capacity building of other actors in the chain (e.g. small producer
entrepreneurs). In the next section, we use the value chain framework
to describe the different dimensions of the Ethiopian cut flower chain,
identify its value adding activities, and examine the participation of
different actors in it.
The theory of dynamic comparative advantage is a useful starting point
for a discussion of the notion of endogenisation. This theory maintains
that comparative advantages of a country are not simply determined by its
particular endowments or characteristics, but need to be created through
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learning (and renewed, one should add, as markets increasingly globalise).
A country may have a particular potential, but needs to realise this
through purposeful action. Seen from a value chain perspective of a new
industry, it is quite likely that the required embedding – the supporting
system of science and technology services and of human resources devel-
opment needed for the industry – may not exist. Similarly the country
concerned may lack the necessary transport and communication infra-
structure in the most attractive production locations. The regulation
and institutional arrangements needed to coordinate and control certain
aspects of the new production and transaction sequence may have to
be developed. Particular inputs needed in the production–transaction
sequence may have to be imported. Export markets have to be found.
Thus, for the realisation of the potential comparative advantages,
there are considerable upfront development costs, and domestic firms
may have neither the capability to enter a new industry on their own, nor
the capacity to finance these upfront costs. Knowledge gaps and risks
may be too large. Foreign direct investment is therefore often relied on
to exploit the potential comparative advantages. The central question
however is to what extent FDI is helpful in developing capabilities of
domestic firms.
Poh (2006) has recently raised this question using a value chain frame-
work. To what extent does FDI contribute to upgrading in the host
country, defined at micro level as a shift from assembly to own-brand
manufacturing, and at macro level from a resource-based production
structure to a capital intensive hi-tech one? Poh defines endogenisation as
the creation of new factors of production in the host country resulting from
exogenous factors brought by TNCs (ibid.). He emphasises that this goes
beyond the ability to produce to the requirements of foreign company
headquarters (which would amount to no more than ‘transplanting’), but
involves a continuous process of learning, bargaining and simultaneously
applying knowledge in order to build up the local capabilities for techno-
logical and organisational innovation, which in the end would lead to the
creation of own factors of production, and to industrial upgrading of
products and technology. Endogenisation is a complex process, requiring
substantial efforts by local firms, as well as the support of sectoral and
other institutions, which themselves may have to be created first as part of
the very same process of endogenisation. Thus, endogenisation does not
only emanate from FDI, but also requires receptive domestic firms, and
needs to be construed or co-produced by a pro-active government policy.
Poh also developed some indicators to measure progress in en-
dogenisation, namely: (a) FDI-induced local physical capital, (b) human
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capital, and (c) knowledge capital. Due to the difficulty of measuring these
indicators directly, he proposed several proxies. Proxies for the first
indicator are change in number of domestic firms relative to the number
of foreign firms active in the industry; change over the years in the
percentage of local content ; and change in total number of domestic
suppliers relative to foreign subsidiaries. Proxies for the second indicator
are qualitative descriptions of domestic entrepreneurs ; acquisition of
managerial expertise ; and the number of engineers, technicians and
workers trained by FDI. Proxies for the third indicators may include the
quality of managerial expertise, production skills, design capability and
development of R&D facilities (ibid. : 57–63).
It is also important to recognise that not only FDI but also international
development cooperation and international NGOs can assist in
endogenisation, especially as regards the embedding of new value chains.
International development cooperation can facilitate the financing of
chains and their associated supporting institutions and infrastructures.
Moreover, it can help speed up the learning process by facilitating
technical assistance and capacity building of firms (through business
development services, BDS), and of supporting and regulatory institutions.
NGOs can play a role in capacity building of small producers and be
active in voluntary regulation concerning new export chains.
Helmsing (2005, 2007) defined endogenisation as the progressive de-
velopment of local capacities and local control over an export base that
was previously shaped by external factors and forces. The element of local
control is important to counterbalance the power asymmetries that may
exist within the global chain. Since it is an on-going cumulative process,
endogenisation has its own phases, though these are not necessarily
sharply separated but may overlap. Initially, endogenisation is concerned
with expanding the base of local producers, by increasing the participation
of local firms in a sector introduced and given shape by external factors
(like FDI). The potential entry of local firms would presumably reveal itself
in high potential profit rates and the success of early starters. It may be
necessary to create financial access for their entry and to facilitate their
acquisition of industry-specific competencies. This can be done through
special financial arrangements from internal and external sources, and by
creating local knowledge centres (universities, vocational schools, testing
and experimental stations). Endogenisation enters a further stage when
the number of firms is large enough to create conditions for cluster
development. Initially cooperation and joint actions may be promoted
on non-core activities (e.g. jointly buying inputs). An important
milestone would be the creation of associations and associative enterprises
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to facilitate and coordinate interaction among firms, as well as between
firms and knowledge centres and supporting institutions (government and
others). Endogenisation reaches a mature level when expanding R&D for
continuous upgrading and innovation on diversified products, marketing
and branding. Government support in terms of an enabling role and
the creation of specialised infrastructures plays a role during the entire
process.
The concept of enclave has been used more widely. Here we use it with
regard to the economic situation and in relation to the effect of FDI and
the position of domestic firms in relation to FDI. Enclave formation in this
setting is characterised by a specific sector controlled by external firms
(FDI), and highly dependent on imported capital and technology which
are neither compatible with local firms’ capacity nor connected to the rest
of the economy (Go¨rg & Strobl 2005; UNCTAD 2005). The number of
domestic firms operating in an enclave thus remains small, and the main
actors in the enclave rarely create backward and forward linkages, so that
it is ‘a mere diffusion of different branches of multinational corporations
among many different countries throughout the international economy’
(Weisskoff & Wolff 1977; see also Hojman 1983). The host country
may suffer more from the outflow of resources than it gains from FDI
inflow. In its zeal to attract FDI and create employment, government
policy (e.g. through export processing zones) may, intentionally or not,
stimulate enclave formation by the type of incentives provided (no import
duties, no VAT on exports, thus making local procurement unattractive).
This becomes even worse if domestic firms cannot apply for these
incentives.
In general, enclave formation refers to the growing exclusion and loss of
local control over the export base of a region or a country ; it concerns an
extractive process by external firms which have very low reinvestment
rates ; and benefits and development of the economy are usually exclusive
to FDI, with little room for linkages and knowledge spillover and learning
by local firms (Helmsing 2005).
On the basis of the above notions we are able to formulate a set of
indicators to use in our study of the Ethiopian cut flower value chain.
Table 1 presents the indicators in three blocks : production, trading in
export markets, and sectoral development. Production indicators refer to
the relative position of domestic firms; the attitude and competencies of
domestic entrepreneurs ; the extent of cooperation between domestic
firms and FDI active in the chain in the form of joint action; and
transfer of knowledge between FDI and domestic firms. Indicators
can also be performance-oriented, such as the production performance of
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TA B L E 1
Indicators for endogenisation and enclave formation
Indicator Endogenisation Enclave formation
Production Domestic firms’ presence relative to FDI High or growing Low and stagnant
Competencies and attitudes of domestic
entrepreneurs Strong and qualified innovative Weak and low qualifications
Cooperation between domestic firms and FDI Occurs Absent
Transfer of knowledge and best practices from
FDI to domestic firms:
– Directly, e.g. through joint ventures
– Indirectly, mobility of management and/or
skilled labour
Occurs Absent
Performance of domestic firms relative to FDI Closing the gap Large gap
Forward linkage Present Absent
Backward linkages Present Absent
Trading FDI control over trading/traders/trade
infrastructure
Absent Present
Market segmentation and/or discrimination of
Domestic firms by international traders
Absent Present
Sectoral development
Host government policy Fiscal incentives and financial instruments Equal for FDI and domestic or in
favour of latter
Exclusively for FDI
International cooperation Benefit of sector development and of sector
institutions
Equal for all or only for domestic
firms
Exclusively in favour of FDI
4
2
A
Y
E
L
E
C
H
T
I
R
U
W
H
A
M
E
L
E
S
E
A
N
D
B
E
R
T
H
E
L
M
S
I
N
G
domestic firms relative to FDI as shown by productivity, price and quality,
and the extent of forward and backward linkages to FDI by domestic
firms. In trading, an important indicator is the existence of an open trade
channel for domestic and FDI alike ; FDI control over international
trade and the existence of market segmentation and/or discrimination of
domestic firms by international traders is likely to reduce the scope
for endogenisation. Sectoral development denotes the creation of the
regulatory and supporting institutions by government policy, directly or
with the assistance of international development cooperation. The key
criterion is the degree to which these developments are exclusively
focussed on FDI or are also open to or exclusively benefiting domestic
firms. As both endogenisation and enclave formation refer to a process
over time, the indicators should denote a change over time. Although the
indicators in Table 1 are static, in practice they are dynamic, indicating a
process.
E V O L U T I O N O F T H E F L O R I C U L T U R E I N D U S T R Y I N E T H I O P I A
Until very recently, Ethiopia was hardly known in the industry, which
in most countries is dominated by roses. Competition is growing as
producers from different parts of the world enter the industry. South
American countries like Ecuador and Colombia are known for production
of large-bud roses, while East African countries produce small-bud roses
(Wijnands 2005). Cut flowers are becoming one of the main export items
in eastern and other African countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia,
Uganda and Kenya. Kenya is the fifth largest exporter in the world
(after The Netherlands, Colombia, Ecuador and Israel). All developing
countries produce mainly for export. The EU, USA and Japan are the
main destination markets. Due to market proximity, most South
American flowers are exported to the USA, whereas Africa mainly caters
for the EU market. Japan is supplied by The Netherlands and by some
Asian and African countries (ibid.).
The Netherlands has a strong position in the global flower market, and
is the hub for the EU cut flower trade, as the largest exporter as well as the
third largest importer in the region. In 2005 The Netherlands’ cut flower
exports amounted to e2.4 billion, and imports to e465 million, mainly
from developing countries (CBI 2006). Kenya supplied the largest share
(36%), followed by Ecuador (11%) and Zimbabwe (6%) (ibid.). Ethiopia
only recently emerged with a large potential for production of small as well
as large-bud roses. As a result it is rapidly taking a significant share in the
Dutch imports. According to one Ethiopian flower trader interviewed in
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2007, Ethiopia’s share is estimated at 10% of the total volume traded at the
VBA auction (about 4 billion stems).
The origin of the industry in Ethiopia can be traced back to the Derg
regime, when summer flowers for export were grown on state farms.1 After
the fall of the regime in 1991, two Ethiopian firms, Ethioflora and Meskel
Flower, pioneered floriculture in Ethiopia, and have been exporting
summer flowers for some time. In the mid nineties, Meskel Flower shifted
its production to roses, due to high competition from Kenyan summer
flower growers in export markets, exporting Ethiopian roses to the
European market for the first time in 1997. Both companies and in par-
ticular Meskel Flower received substantial technical and financial support
from the World Bank and from FMO (Finance for Development) from
Holland. However, they faced an unfavourable investment climate, and
had limited experience and knowledge about the business. Moreover,
there was little support from government. The companies had difficulties
acquiring sufficient and suitable land, purchasing necessary inputs,
financing and transporting the flowers to the market.2
The first foreign investor, Golden Rose, arrived in 1999 from the United
Kingdom and showed Ethiopia’s potential to grow quality roses. Its suc-
cess attracted additional domestic and foreign investors such as ENYI
Rose and Summit (domestic firms), and Ethio-Dream ( joint venture).
According to a World Bank (2004) study, these four companies were the
only rose exporters until the beginning of 2004. Since then, FDI has in-
creased rapidly, especially from The Netherlands.
Currently, the floriculture of Ethiopia can be divided into three
groups : roses under greenhouse, cuttings under greenhouse,3 and sum-
mer flowers. About 80% of the total production area is covered by roses,
which are cultivated mostly on soil and in some cases on hydroponics
( Joosten 2007). Each farm grows 3–10 varieties of roses. The flower farms
are mainly concentrated in the highlands, ranging from 1,550 to 2,600
metres and within a 200 km radius from Addis Ababa where the inter-
national airport is located. Concentrations of farms are found in the
vicinity of the towns of Holleta, Ziway, Sebeta, Debre Zeit and Addis
Alem (see Table 2). In March 2006, 2,031 hectares of land were allocated
to investors for floriculture development, and by June 2007, 801.6 hec-
tares were in production.4 As of June 2007, seventy companies were
active in the industry and six companies were setting up operations. In
the three years up to 2007, both export volume and earnings showed
more than fivefold growth (see Table 3), and this made flowers the sixth
largest export commodity of the country, after coffee, oilseeds, chat,
leather and live animals (ENST 2006).
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FDI in floriculture and the Dutch role
The attractiveness of Ethiopia for FDI in floriculture derives from several
factors. The natural resource endowment makes the country attractive for
growing high-quality flowers in diverse varieties in the highlands and at a
range of altitudes. In addition, abundant water, land and proximity to the
EU market, with lower transport costs than Kenya, give Ethiopia basic
competitive advantages (GRET 2006). In addition to cheap and readily
available labour, the external growers mention the low rate of crime and
corruption.5 Ethiopia is a low-cost production location, similar to Kenya
as is shown in Table 4.
Unit farming costs and unit farm-to-market costs are higher in Ethiopia
than Kenya due to higher productivity in the latter. However, this is more
T A B L E 2
Location of cut flower farms
Common cluster
name
Number of
farms
Percentage
of farms
Mean distance
from Addis
Ababa (km)
Mean altitude
(meters above
sea level)
Debre Zeit 7 10.9 49.6 1,870
Ziway 6 9.4 163.0 1,644
Sebeta/Alemgena 10 15.6 25.9 2,082
Koka 3 4.7 98.0 1,617
Sendafa/Slulta 5 7.8 38.4 2,228
Holeta/Addis Alem 20 31.3 39.3 2,289
Menagesha 5 7.8 32.8 2,570
Others 8 12.5 93.5 1,847
Total 64 100.0 58.9 2,081
Source : Mulu 2008, Table 2.
T A B L E 3
Evolution of floriculture in Ethiopia
Year
Number of
farms (growers)
Cultivated
area (ha)
Number of
exported stems
Export value
(UD$)
2001/2 305,000
2002/3 16,000,000 2,900,000
2003/4 32,000,000 5,500,000
2004/5 30 150 83,000,000 12,700,000
2005/6 69 345 186,000,000 22,900,000
2006/7 70 801.6 478,144,926 63,601,220
Source : primary data MOTI 2007; Ethiopian Customs Authority.
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than compensated for by the higher unit price which Ethiopian flowers
fetch, creating a higher profitability in Ethiopia. Moreover, Ethiopia is still
in the initial stage of development of the industry, hence the learning curve
is yet to rise, potentially resulting in considerable productivity gains. The
development of the institutions and infrastructure supporting the chain is
equally at an incipient stage. Hence, one may expect future reductions in
farming and farm-to-market costs due to productivity increases on the
farms, as well as in other segments of the chain.
Export-oriented, high value agricultural products like floriculture
are seen by the Ethiopian government as a priority, to implement its
‘agriculture-led industrialisation strategy’. A favourable investment
climate has been created as the government introduced fiscal incentives
including a five-year tax holiday, custom duty exemptions, loss carry
forward and remittance of funds (EIA website). The Ethiopian Investment
Agency (EIA) serves as a one-stop shop to facilitate investments, and in
addition most of the government services related to investment have been
reformed, including easy access to land on a leasehold basis.
Last but not least, the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) provides
soft loans to the sector. The bank extends credits up to 70% of the total
investment, pledging no other collateral than the project itself. It is difficult
to ascertain how important this has been in practice. Comparing data
from the EIA with data from DBE, we can conclude that 42 of the 57
investors (74%) in the industry registered by the EIA in 2007 had loans
from the DBE. According to EIA data, 27 of these investors had a total
registered capital of 1.1 billion birr (or e88m). According to DBE data they
T A B L E 4
Benchmarking rose production in Ethiopia and Kenya, 2005/6
Ethiopia Kenya
Production (farming) cost/ha $63,334 $81,134
Plants/ha 65,000 80,000
Stems/ha 1,685,000 2,300,000
Loss rates 2% 5%
Marketable stems/ha 1,651,000 2,180,000
Farming cost/stem US¢3.84 US¢3.50
Post harvest, transport and
marketing US¢11.66 US¢ 8.60
Total cost/stem US¢15.5 US¢12.10
Sales price/stem US¢18.3 US¢14.40
Note : The data refer to running costs only, excluding setup costs.
Source : adapted from GDS 2006.
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had approved loans to the value of 623 million birr, or 56% of registered
capital. Of these loans more than 77% had already been disbursed in 2007.
The list of 27 investors includes 7 Ethiopian investors and 20 non-
Ethiopians, among them 3 Dutch growers. These Dutch growers had
approved loans equal to 46% of their registered capital. For Dutch
growers the DBE finance is less important, due to PSOM and the Sher
project (see below).
In addition to the attractiveness of Ethiopia pulling FDI into the
country, there have also been push factors stimulating FDI growth in this
industry. Globalisation had led to a wider search for alternative invest-
ment opportunities, but in particular countries (e.g. Holland) there have
been push factors driving investment abroad, due to rising production
costs, growth of more profitable alternative crops (e.g. decorative plants
and orchids) displacing cut flowers within existing green houses, in com-
bination with limited room for domestic expansion and stricter environ-
mental and land use planning regulations.6
Last but not least, rich countries may have bilateral or support multi-
lateral programmes to promote FDI in Ethiopia. The Dutch programme
for cooperation in emerging markets (PSOM) is one, and played an im-
portant role in stimulating Dutch growers to invest in Ethiopia. PSOM
provides grants for up to 60% of the costs of projects of joint ventures
(EVD website). Currently, about eleven purely Dutch FDI and seven
Dutch joint ventures are operating in the sector. About eight of these
obtained PSOM grants-in-aid. The recipients are either Dutch–Ethiopian
joint ventures or include additional partners. Recipients are obliged to
operate under internationally accepted quality standards, called Milieu
Programma Sierteelt (MPS). MPS is an international certification scheme for
floriculture that focuses on creating a socially and environmental friendly
working culture at an internationally accepted level (Wijnands 2005).
Initiated by The Netherlands in 1995 and later spread to other countries, it
monitors chemical use, recycling practice, energy and water use by farms,
and also addresses health and occupational safety issues and employment
conditions.7
Dutch FDI has responded to the attractive conditions of Ethiopian
floriculture. In 2003, a group of business people, part of a Dutch trade
mission, visited Ethiopia to investigate the investment climate especially
in floriculture. However, this had little immediate effect until another
visit was organised in 2004 (RNE 2004). This group showed real interest
in floriculture, and according to Dutch Embassy representatives in
Ethiopia, this was in all likelihood the moment the Dutch started entering
the sector.
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An important additional factor that made Ethiopia an attractive location
for Dutch flower growers is the operations of Sher Ethiopia Ltd, a sub-
sidiary of Sher Holland BV, the largest rose company in the world. Sher
started operations in Ethiopia in June 2005, and builds ‘ turnkey’ projects
that are sold to investors on a hire–purchase basis. These projects include
building the greenhouses, and technologies needed for production such as
irrigation and central spraying units. The ‘ready to operate’ greenhouses
are then rented to investors, and ownership is transferred after 8–9 years.
Sher-Ethiopia leased 350 hectares from the Ethiopian government at
Ziway, 163 km outside Addis Ababa, at an altitude of 1,650 m right next
to Lake Ziway (Sher-Holland website).8 By June 2007, Sher-Ethiopia
operations covered 187 hectares of land, and were expected to reach
207 hectares by June 2008 (MOTI 2007). Sher-Holland BV facilitated in
this way the entry of new growers, who do not have to incur high upfront
development and investment outlays and the high risks implied in their
recuperation. This is an important factor which normally acts as a barrier
to overseas investment by small and medium enterprises. Many Dutch
flower growers are small and medium-sized family owned firms.
Furthermore, Sher-Ethiopia Ltd operates in other parts of the value chain:
it imports and distributes inputs for flower production, and provides logistic
services, transport, handling and agent services for producers in Holland.
In conclusion, the enormous expansion of the sector since 2004 is due to
the combined effect of several factors : Ethiopia is an attractive location
due to its natural resource endowment, recently established incentives to
attract FDI, the Dutch government programme promoting Dutch-Ethio
joint ventures, and the Sher-Holland BV turnkey project. FDI in this in-
dustry is not so much about private capital inflows, as it can be financed
domestically or indirectly with external loans and grants (e.g. PSOM). Its
central significance concerns industry-specific technologies, know-how
and entrepreneurship.
T H E E T H I O P I A N C U T F L O W E R V A L U E C H A I N
The Ethiopian floriculture value chain, from farm to market, can be div-
ided into farming (pre-harvest), post-harvest, transport and marketing.
Pre-harvesting includes activities like selecting the appropriate variety,
planting, irrigation and applying the necessary inputs to grow at required
quality and to control diseases. Figure 1 below gives a schematic
representation.
As planting the right variety is decisive for success in the sector, breeders
are crucial actors in the chain: ‘breeders are those who have a unique
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right on a variety : the exclusive right to apply for a breeders ’ right or an
exclusive right on a granted breeders’ right’ (Kras 2004). Accordingly,
breeders sell propagation materials for the varieties themselves, or licence
others who are usually breeders as well as propagators to sell the protected
varieties (ibid.). Domestic producers also buy the variety in this way,9
but the breeders sell certain varieties to a select group of flower growers
to maximise the protection of their varieties (ibid. ; GRET 2006). For
soil-grown roses, farming represents only 25% of the total cost (GDS
2006).
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The Ethiopian cut flower value chain.
T H E E TH I O P I A N CUT F LOWER I N DU S T RY 49
After harvesting the flowers, each farm undertakes post-harvest ac-
tivities such as sorting, cutting to the required length, bunching and
packing. These post-harvest costs represent less than 2% of total costs
(GDS 2006). Most of the growers have their own cooled processing
and packing warehouse and cool trucks. The flowers are inspected at the
airport by officers of the Ethiopian Customs Authority (ECA) and the
Ministry of Agriculture. Ethiopian Airlines is the industry’s principal
airfreight carrier, due to a partnership with EHSC (to be discussed later) :
it transported 70% of the flowers in 2006/7. KLM, Lufthansa and Etihad
transport the remaining share (MOTI 2007).
According to a GDS study, 67% of Ethiopian flowers are sold at auc-
tions in The Netherlands through VBA or FloraHolland, both of which
have their own representatives in Ethiopia to facilitate the marketing.
Since Ethiopian Airlines cargo lands in Brussels, Ethiopian producers
need to buy logistic services to transport their flowers from Brussels to an
agent in Holland. One Dutch company, J. van de Put, provides these
logistic services for Ethiopian exporters, and also offers the same services
in Ethiopia.10
The next step in the value chain is that the flowers arrive (within three
days) at a selling agent (trader), who is an important intermediary between
domestic firms and the market. The agents’ main activities are to unpack
and refresh the flowers, make them presentable for the market, and dis-
play them at the auction. They also handle trade-related activities with the
auctioneers. Dutch companies trade their flowers directly through the
company head office or a related subsidiary, via the auctions, or in other
ways (direct sales). Transport and marketing represent more than 70% of
total costs (GDS 2006, see Fig. 2).11
The Dutch auctions are the largest flower marketplaces in the world,
supplying diverse types of flowers from different origins, and with a level of
quality which is independently graded by the auctioneers themselves.
Similarly, the demand side embraces retailers and importers from differ-
ent countries (see VBA website). Both suppliers and buyers enjoy con-
siderable benefits from this system. Buyers benefit from the wide range of
supply at an assured quality level which also lowers the transaction costs,
while suppliers benefit from the transparent pricing system of the auctions.
Moreover, the auction offers the opportunity to sell globally and build up
image and reputation, and also guarantees the payment to be settled every
week (Ammerlaan 2005; Elshof 1996).
The auctions conduct large amounts of transactions very quickly and
efficiently with the clock system and ‘projected’ display information on the
type of flower, the producing company, its origin and its quality standard.
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Based on market knowledge, the actual supply and the quality level, the
auctioneer announces the highest price to start the auction; then the clock
keeps dropping until any buyer stops it to buy at a certain price (Wijnands
2005). Auctioning is a classic case of arm’s-length trading. The auction
buyer and Ethiopian supplier do not meet, and have hardly any further
trade relationship, as was confirmed during interviews.
Other than presenting the flowers in the auction, the intermediary
agents also play an important role as a source of market information for
Ethiopian producers, and create opportunities to upgrade product quality
by giving remarks on every shipment.12 Interviews with Ethiopian pro-
ducers and one of their main agents (DecoFresh Holland) show that agents
pay study visits to the farms of their customers in Ethiopia and provide
such feedback. Agents can play a role in stabilising the price in the market
by withholding certain varieties during days of excess supply, enabling the
producers to get a better price. They also search for direct marketing
opportunities, and facilitate the process as required. Direct marketing and
sales are an alternative to selling at auction. However, only a few domestic
growers sell more than 30% of their product via direct marketing and
sales. According to the study sample data, one Ethiopian producer trades
90% of its flowers via direct marketing, but this is exceptional.
Domestic firms and their positioning in the chain
Among the Ethiopian entrepreneurs who entered the floriculture industry,
one can distinguish three main groups. First, there are a number of well-
established family-owned businesses which became successful in domestic
or import trade, or in growing and processing other agricultural products
or even in manufacturing, construction and transport. These were at-
tracted by the high profitability of the new industry, and often hire foreign
consultants and production managers to set themselves up in it. A second
group consists of diaspora entrepreneurs (often Ethiopian-born but now
with another nationality), who returned to Ethiopia after the defeat of the
Derg or more recently, and invested in the new sector, sometimes with the
Farming
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Post-harvest
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73.5%
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Components of the Ethiopian cut flower value chain.
Source : GDS 2006.
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help of hired foreign consultants. A third group consists of Ethiopians who
established their own enterprises, having acquired working experience in
the industry in Kenya or elsewhere. These include the entrepreneurs who
pioneered the flower industry with summer flowers before switching to
roses. In other words, the domestic firms were set up by entrepreneurs
who had already been successful in other industries, and have either general
competence to set up new businesses, or specific technical competencies
in the sector itself. Few have a long-established reputation in the industry,
but they do have the competence and experience to run a business
in Ethiopia. The educational level of most domestic growers is a first
university degree or higher.
All interviewed Ethiopian growers except one have at least one
expatriate consultant or production manager.13 Expatriate consultants
and managers are an important source of learning for the Ethiopian
entrepreneurs. One of the domestic producers said: ‘ thanks to my money,
whatever knowledge and technology I need, I can bring from any corner
of the world’ (interview). Domestic growers also make study tours to The
Netherlands and to other African countries, to gain experience and select
appropriate technologies.
Product variety, quality and the consistency of the supplier are the
major factors required for success in this market. For this, domestic firms
rely often on expatriate consultants. In addition they get feedback from
their agents (traders) to improve product quality. As a result, domestic
producers are strengthening their competitiveness. One of the Dutch
flower traders expressed his view about the competence of domestic pro-
ducers : ‘ they come with unbelievable quality ! ’ (interview). However, as
regards product upgrading, Dutch breeders hold a strong position, as they
control access to new varieties. Only a few domestic producers both grow
and propagate roses for their own needs.
According to the Development Bank of Ethiopia, the main provider of
finance to the sector, domestic growers have a good track record in loan
repayment, and in 2007 no Ethiopian producer had accrued arrears.
During interviews, auctions representatives also expressed an optimistic
view about domestic producers. However, Dutch growers in Ethiopia are
far more critical of their Ethiopian counterparts. Two Dutch producers
interviewed believe that competition in the sector will crowd out 40–50%
of the domestic producers, due to lack of experience and knowledge in
growing flowers. One of them said:
Ethiopian growers think that flower business will make them earn money fast and
easy. They don’t understand that growing flowers is a way of living or better a
lifestyle, and that you have to spend all of your time with the flowers. Local
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producers think they can manage their production by staying in the city and
come to their farm once a month … also they don’t want to spend money to hire
consultants …
(interview)
Table 5 provides quantitative insight into the export performance of
Ethiopian producers, compared with Dutch and other FDI firms.14 During
the year 2005/6–2006/7, the quantity of flowers exported increased
amongst all categories of firms. Ethiopian growers had an average annual
growth of 51.4%, which is below the growth rate of the sector as a whole
(163.7%), and much below the export performance by the Dutch FDI
(584%). That is the highest growth rate as compared with all other groups
of producers, although the Dutch FDI started from a much lower initial
level. This indicates that domestic producers need to improve their pro-
ductivity in order to strengthen their position in the sector. Table 4 also
shows that domestic producers reported the highest selling price per stem
in 2005/6, and the third highest in 2006/7, next to the Dutch and Dutch
joint ventures with other FDI.
According to calculations based on data obtained from MOTI,
Ethiopian farms account for 37% of the land under flower cultivation, and
25% of the total export volume. FDI uses 49% of the land under flower
cultivation but provides 57% of the export volume,15 showing that on
average Ethiopian farms have a much lower productivity than FDI ones.
This confirms the critical view expressed above by a Dutch grower.
The European market is the main destination for Ethiopian flowers. In
2003–5, exports to three European countries, The Netherlands, Germany
and UK, constituted 90% of the total export of Ethiopian flowers ( Joosten
2007). Nowadays, new Ethiopian flower destinations are emerging in the
Middle East, Japan and USA. Russia and Scandinavian countries are also
becoming new destinations.
Ethiopia entered the world flower market after the market changed
from being supply-driven to becoming demand-driven ( Joosten ibid.). The
increasing flower supply from Africa to serve the same market is one of the
challenges for Ethiopian flowers growers to build their own niche.
Nevertheless, Ethiopia has shown a tremendous growth in market share,
and in 2006 was the third largest supplier in one of the Dutch auctions,
VBA, next to Kenya and Israel. In the same year, Ethiopian roses fetched
the third top price in the auction (e0.157/stem) after The Netherlands
(e0.334/stem) and Ecuador (e0.308/stem) (HortiNews 2007).
Likewise, one of the main traders of Ethiopian flowers at VBA
confirmed that Ethiopian roses are securing the top price in auction
and he mentioned that ‘you cannot compare Ethiopian flower with
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TA B L E 5
Ethiopian floriculture export performance
Producers by nationality
Year 2005/2006 Year 2006/2007
No. of
exporter
Quantity
in stems
Value
(US$)
Average
price/stem
(US$)
No. of
exporter
Quantity
in stems
Value
(US$)
Average
price/stem
(US$)
Ethiopian 21 74,766,217 6,178,369 12.10 38 113,248,184 13,087,223 8.65
Dutch (FDI) 4 26,171,522 2,291,147 11.42 11 179,023,697 17,533,125 10.21
Joint Ethio & Dutch 4 8,781,138 1,093,938 8.03 5 41,152,670 5,408,788 7.61
Joint Ethio & others 4 15,770,132 1,746,502 9.03 4 21,869,052 3,156,154 6.93
Joint Dutch & others (FDI) 2 1,912,635 176,717 10.82 2 10,030,435 1,146,800 8.75
Others+unknown 14 53,915,331 10,476,585 5.15 26 112,820,888 23,269,130 4.85
Total 49 181,316,975 21,963,258 8.26 86 478,144,926 63,601,220 7.52
Note : Average price/stem is f.o.b. Addis Ababa Airport.
Source : Calculations based on data obtained from the Ethiopian Customs Authority (ECA).
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Kenya … The moment Ethiopian flowers appear in the auction the price
lifts up above the average immediately…’ (interview). An international
VBA import officer in Addis Ababa echoed this view. More recently,
Ethiopian flower producers have begun entering the major retail super-
market chains, such as Morrisons of UK. This has a great contribution
towards diversifying the market (MET website).
Interactions between Dutch FDI and Ethiopian firms
The Ethiopian floriculture industry consists of domestic and foreign in-
vestors who have different levels of knowledge and experience in different
parts of the chain. Dutch firms are dominant players in the chain of
Ethiopian floriculture. Prior to arriving in Ethiopia, they had built up a
trademark and reputation in the international market. Domestic pro-
ducers have limited exposure and knowledge, and can potentially gain
from the spillover of experiences from Dutch FDI. Spillover effects can
happen if the two interact with each other, if direct linkages occur, and/or
if the two start cooperating on particular joint activities. Below we will
examine the degree to which these are happening.
At present, the level of linkage and cooperation seems to be incipient,
albeit growing. There is limited crowding in of domestic input suppliers
and other service providers. Both Ethiopian and Dutch growers who were
interviewed confirm that their cooperation rarely passes the stage of non-
core activities like borrowing input from neighbours in case of temporary
shortage, exchanging information, buying non-strategic inputs jointly, and
participating in social activities.
The Dutch have strong relationships amongst themselves. They visit
each other’s farms and receive feedback; they discuss better ways of doing
business, the market and local conditions. Only a few domestic producers
have such relationships between themselves or with Dutch growers.
According to some domestic growers this may be due to the existing
business culture of the country, which was unused to cooperation and
collective learning before. They also felt that trust had yet to be estab-
lished, so as to facilitate cooperation in core activities in the sector. During
the interview one of the domestic producers said: ‘you know we
Ethiopians have problem … we’re stuck with traditional ways of doing
business … no cooperation between competitors. We think that we only
compete with the producers around us forgetting the global competition
out there which can throw out all of us from the sector …’ (interview).
The Dutch do not attend producer meetings regularly because they do
not think that they gain much, except for dealing with local conditions and
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paper work. Most domestic producers therefore think that the Dutch
growers are highly reserved and unwilling to forge relationships with
local growers. Such perceptions can hinder learning exchange between
domestic producers and Dutch FDI. Notwithstanding, many expect
relationships to improve as the sector gets more established and producers
get to know each other better. For instance, one of the pioneers of Dutch
FDI in the sector said that ‘cooperation with Ethiopians at first was
difficult, but once you have reached a partnership, it is a solid one’
(HortiNews 2007).
In this regard, the growers under the Sher-Ethiopia turnkey project
are in a better position to cooperate, and are already undertaking more
joint activities than producers located elsewhere. For instance, they jointly
hire cool trucks, and visit each others’ farms more frequently. They set
common standards for wage payment to minimise turnover of workers,
which used to be a problem before. Furthermore, they regularly meet
with Sher-Ethiopia’s managing director to discuss issues such as the
development of their business and social security. This creates better
opportunities for domestic and Dutch growers to get to know each
other and to work together. One of the Ethiopian producers under Sher-
Ethiopia stated that there is a certain diffusion of best practices from
Dutch FDI: ‘I learned from my foreign neighbours how to improve
productivity and to spend more time in my farm, more than 40 hours a
week’ (interview).
Dutch firms dominate breeding of roses in the world. Five out of the six
companies, which together are responsible for 70–80% of world breeding
output, are Dutch-owned. These firms work closely with Dutch growers
and this gives Dutch FDI in Ethiopia privileged access to best varieties,
which further boosts their competitive advantage in the sector over
Ethiopian as well as other growers. Breeders play an important role in the
market. For instance, they release specific varieties for a specific period of
time for selected clients, so that the price of those varieties can remain
higher. Some Ethiopian producers complained during interviews about
their difficulties in getting access to these top varieties.
The role of Dutch development cooperation in the development of the Ethiopian
cut flower chain
The development of supporting institutions has made considerable
advances and these have facilitated the rapid expansion of the industry.
This subsection briefly notes its main advances and examines the role of
Dutch development cooperation in the process.
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The Ethiopian Horticulture Producers and Exporters Association
(EHPEA), created in 2002, is an important actor and vehicle for the
implementation of development cooperation programmes. Currently it
has seventy members, of whom more than 90% are flower producers.
EHPEA represents the interests of the growers vis-a`-vis the government,
and plays an important role in building the competitiveness of the sector.
It provides the following services to its members (EHPEA website) :
representing its members nationally as well as internationally ; lobbying
with government to promote the interest of growers ; providing market
information and facilitating new entrants ; building up partnerships
with national and international organisations, and initiating projects for
development of the sector ; organising and implementing capacity building
in the sector ; organising events and exhibitions ; and promoting the sector.
In 2006 the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Security
(LNV) opened an office at the Netherlands embassy, and assigned an
agriculture counsellor to promote bi-lateral relations with special focus on
the floriculture sector. In the same year, the Ethiopia–Netherlands
Horticulture Partnership (ENHP) was signed to promote the development
of the sector and to enhance an enabling environment through public–
private partnership. The ENHP incorporates the following (Helder &
De Jager 2006) : capacity building programme for the floriculture sector;
creation of a code of practice for the sector ; capacity building of a
Phytosanitary Unit ; provision of market and sector information services ;
action plan for Integrated Pest Management; decision support system
for selecting new production areas ; study tours to different countries
(Ethiopian delegations to Zambia, Kenya and The Netherlands) ; and
investment guidance manual for floriculture.
Following the partnership programme, support funds have been made
available within the International Research Programme of the LNV
Ministry. Activities listed in the partnership are based on the findings of
the Ethiopian horticulture development strategy study undertaken by
Wageningen University and Research Centre (WUR), implementation of
which is underway.
The growers’ association and The Netherlands embassy work together
to implement the activities with regard to ENHP. Currently, the associ-
ation is implementing the Code of Practice to enhance the sustainability of
the sector and to generate well-trained staff. This provides a performance
standard at three levels, which should be followed at least by the members
of the association. Meeting the requirements under the Code of Practice
enables the producers to meet the international MPS standards already
noted.
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Experienced expatriate specialists in vocational horticulture training
have developed and coordinated the training, along with four domestic
experts who were sponsored under the partnership by the Dutch govern-
ment. This training programme is planned to be placed in a new
vocational horticultural training centre, recently approved under ENHP
for Jimma University to strengthen its contribution to horticulture, and
more specifically floriculture sector development. Jimma University is a
local university for agriculture research, which will become the main
source of human resource development and of agricultural research
and specialist services. The creation of this local knowledge centre will
therefore play an important role in the future consolidation of the value
chain.
Last but not least, there is the Dutch programme for emerging
markets, PSOM. Besides its role in promoting the expansion of farm
production through joint ventures, this has facilitated the establishment
of supporting services. The Ethiopian Perishables Logistics Company
received the grant and established cool truck and storage for perish-
able flowers and vegetables from farm to their destination in Europe.
PSOM grant aided a horticulture supplier company called Horticoop,
which provides essential laboratory services for water and soil analysis
(RNE no. 10, 2007).
D E V E L O P M E N T A L I M P A C T S O F T H E F L O R I C U L T U R E I N D U S T R Y I N
E T H I O P I A
The following brief discussion focuses on the sector’s impact regarding the
creation of employment, foreign exchange earnings, forward and back-
ward linkages, and joint activities between flower growers to enhance the
collective efficiency of the sector.
The floriculture sector of Ethiopia is an important generator of em-
ployment. Based on data from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, we
calculated that the sector had generated 15,200 permanent and 8,800
casual jobs by June 2007. A 2008 survey (Mulu 2008) puts the figure
even higher at 25,000 permanent workers. Most workers (60–70%) are
women who, according to the growers interviewed, are preferred as
they are more committed and work neatly. In addition, according to
MOTI data, more than 10,000 labourers were engaged in construction
of greenhouses as of March 2006. Due to the fact that most flower
farms are located in rural areas, they become an important source of
livelihood for many local people, and inhabitants are able to diversify
their sources of income and escape from severe poverty. Most of the
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workers are unskilled. They earn US$0.78–1.67 per day. In the case of
the Sher-Ethiopia project, the producers fixed the minimum wage at
$1.1 per day. Nevertheless, the workers are not yet unionised to protect
their own rights.
The floriculture sector also generates foreign exchange. Table 3 shows
the tremendous growth in the past five years (MOTI 2007). According to
the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), Ethiopia does not fully benefit, as
the selling price reported by exporters is below the price which Ethiopian
flowers actually fetch in export markets. As a result, the country loses
significant amounts of foreign exchange revenue (ibid.). In 2006 the NBE
issued a directive which required the exporters’ association to report on
auction prices offered for Ethiopian flowers. This would enable the NBE
to verify prices declared by exporters as part of their export permits. In
2007 the NBE issued directive FXD/32/2007, which required all com-
mercial banks to reject flower export permit applications with a price
below US¢10 per stem.16
There are some backward linkages in non-core inputs, but local
content in the sector remains very low. It is highly dependent on im-
ported inputs to grow flowers. According to data obtained during
fieldwork, about 80% of the required input is imported and only 20%
is produced domestically ; this mainly involves packing materials.17
According to MOTI data collected in 2006, more than ten domestic
firms supply locally produced packing materials, and several importers
of other inputs have emerged, as have other service providers in
logistics and a soil analysis laboratory. In the case of forward linkages,
a few domestic firms are trying to sell directly to buyers and are cre-
ating retail shops locally in exclusive restaurants, supermarkets and
main streets.
In 2004 the Ethio-Horti-Share Company (EHSC) was established by a
small group of both domestic and foreign producers, as a profit making
company to provide services for all interested producers, and undertake
activities related to cargo transport and the import of inputs. Through the
EHSC, growers jointly import fertilisers in bulk. In addition it has devel-
oped a mutually beneficial partnership with Ethiopian Airlines through
which growers jointly rent cargo planes. EHSC receives the growers’
production and export plans in advance to plan and rent cargo space.
During the low season for Ethiopian flowers, the company sells excess
cargo capacity to other interested parties, especially vegetable exporters,
thereby reducing transport costs for its flower growers. Thanks to the same
partnership Ethiopian Airlines has secured a major share of the flower
transport market.
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TA B L E 6
Development direction of Ethiopian floriculture sector
Component Indicator
Towards
Endogenisation Enclave formation
Production Concentration of domestic
firms in the sector
– quantitatively Growing number of firms and
of production area …
but FDI dominates
– qualitatively (level of
local ownership and
control)
Land ownership, Association
(EHPEA), Airfreight
services (ET)
informal networks of
Dutch growers
Competencies and
attitudes of domestic
entrepreneurs
Domestic entrepreneurs
with hands off attitude;
low qualifications
and attracted by quick
profits only
Cooperation between
domestic firms and FDI
Incipient but … in non-core activities
only
Transfer of knowledge
and best practices
Directly through joint
ventures ; indirectly
via labour mobility
Performance of domestic
firms (productivity,
quality and price)-
Higher quality and price for
domestic firms compared
with competitors in the
Region …
but much lower quality,
price and productivity
than FDI
Forward linkages Incipient direct sales little through FDI
Backward linkages Incipient but growing, … but limited to non-core
inputs and some services
Access to varieties for
domestic firms and FDI
Restrictive practices of
Dutch breeders
Upgrading opportunities
for domestic firms
Incipient but growing via traders,
expatriate consultants and
sector institutions
Trading FDI control over
trading/ traders/trade
infrastructure
Dutch cooperative flower
auctions are an open trade
channel for domestic firms
Intra-firm trading
by FDI
Market segmentation Restrictive practices by
breeders result in some
market segmentation
Sectoral
development
Policies by Ethiopian
Government – FDI
policy
Financial incentives open to
all firms (domestic loans
against projects ;
loan guarantees)
International cooperation
by Dutch government
$ PSOM
$ ENHP
$ University
cooperation
Diffusion of MPS standards
to domestic firms
PSOM open only to
Dutch firms (but
results in joint
ventures between
Dutch and Ethiopian
firms)Creation of local knowledge
centre ( Jimma University)
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D E V E L O P M E N T D I R E C T I O N O F T H E E T H I O P I A N C U T F L O W E R
V A L U E C H A I N A N D T H E T R I P L E R O L E O F T H E D U T C H
In previous sections, we have described and assessed the main aspects
of the floriculture value chain, and looked at the role of FDI and
domestic firms and other supporting actors and their activities. We can
now synthesise its development direction, applying the assessment criteria
summarised in Table 1 in order to answer the question concerning the
development direction, towards endogenisation or enclave formation.
In addition we have examined the three major roles of Dutch actors
in the Ethiopian floriculture value chain, i.e. production, trading and in-
stitutional sector development. The Dutch are dominant actors in all
three roles, and we can attempt to answer the question to what extent
these roles have been reinforcing each other, and to the extent that they
do, whether this is only to the benefit of Dutch FDI. Findings are sum-
marised in Table 6.
The assessment shows that a number of criteria score positively for
endogenisation: it may be emerging but, it should be stressed, from in-
cipient and very low levels. On balance, there are positive signs but global
quality competition remains a serious challenge to Ethiopian firms and
supporting institutions. It should also be stressed that endogenisation is a
process : continuous improvement in all the criteria is crucial to sustain
progress. It is also a two-sided process : does FDI enlist local firms and
share technological capabilities, and are local firms ready to acquire
these? Are local institutions supporting such efforts?
The role of FDI as a source of private capital inflow is much less im-
portant than expected. We found that a considerable part of the invest-
ment of both Ethiopian and foreign flower investors is financed from DBE
loans. In addition Dutch investors can obtain investment grants from their
own government if they invest in joint ventures with Ethiopian firms. Last
but not least, the Sher project permits investors to obtain ready to operate
greenhouses on a hire–purchase basis, eliminating the need for upfront
investment in fixed assets. Many Dutch growers have entered such
agreements with Sher.
FDI is a source of technological know-how, especially through joint
ventures and very limited knowledge spillovers. Cooperation between
Ethiopian and FDI growers is incipient and limited to non-core but
nevertheless important logistic and procurement services. The interaction
between Dutch and Ethiopian growers is however limited (with the ex-
ception of the Sher project), the number of joint ventures is relatively
small, and inter-firm cooperation is restricted to the same non-core ac-
tivities (notably farm to airport logistics and input procurement). Dutch
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growers in Ethiopia do not directly provide market access to Ethiopian
growers, but the Dutch cooperative auctions have internationalised, and
provide crucial market access. At the same time, Dutch breeders adopt
restricted practices in licencing and distributing new varieties, giving pri-
ority to established international clients over new local entrants.
Looking at the other side of endogenisation, the technological capacities
of Ethiopian entrepreneurs are weak. Ethiopian entrepreneurs rely on
expatriate experts contracted from abroad (India, Kenya), who assist them
in acquiring productive capacities. While the entrepreneurs have general
competencies about doing business in Ethiopia, their industry-specific
competencies and attitudes may not be strong enough to ensure the en-
dogenisation process, though there are important exceptions. In terms of
Lall’s classification of technological capacities (Lall & Narula 2004),
Ethiopian firms have mostly acquired production capacities, often with
the help of foreign consultants, while investment capacities may not be
very strong, as evidenced by imitative behaviour.
The creation of indigenous technological effort centres on the creation
of supporting institutions. International cooperation plays a significant
role, especially with regard to the diffusion of MPS standards and the
creation of a knowledge centre at a university. This has yet to materialise,
and it would take a number of years of capacity building for it to develop a
reputation in the industry. In future this would make it possible to build
advanced competitive advantages (Porter 1985).
In conclusion, FDI does not share core capabilities, nor do domestic
firms active in the industry seem eager to acquire these, as evidenced by
their hands-off attitude. International cooperation contributed to create a
potential for endogenisation, especially in the medium term, but it would
need a new breed of domestic entrepreneurs to take up the challenge.
The next question is whether the triple roles of the Dutch reinforce each
other, serving only the interest of Dutch FDI. From the analysis presented
it is important to conclude that Dutch FDI and Dutch trading auctions,
which trade Ethiopian flowers, are independent entities. Auctions, which
have evolved historically through cooperative action by Dutch growers to
protect themselves from undue trader influence, are now performing the
same function for Ethiopian growers. Dutch FDI commonly resort to
intra-firm trading and trade directly with interested parties, so that the two
indeed operate in parallel. Importantly, Dutch FDI is, above all, non-
financial in origin. Many Dutch firms acquire their production facilities on
a hire–purchase basis and can raise domestic finance. Dutch growers are
medium-sized firms with a strong commitment to the industry, and may
be less mobile than large TNCs. This may constitute an advantage for
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improved relationships in the future. With regard to the third role, Dutch
development cooperation, it would be fair to conclude that this tends to
benefit the whole sector and specifically Ethiopian firms. The introduction
and diffusion of the MPS standard and the creation of an R&D and HRD
centre all contribute to strengthen production capabilities. This is not the
case for PSOM, whose grants are designed to benefit Dutch FDI, though
PSOM aims to create joint ventures which are potentially an important
channel for knowledge transfer.
In this paper, we have examined the evolution of the Ethiopian cut flower
industry and raised two questions. The first refers to the long-term benefits
for Ethiopia of an industry dominated by FDI. Will the new industry
become an enclave, or will it be accompanied by a process of building
local capabilities, a process which we denominate endogenisation? As the
cut flower industry in Ethiopia is characterised by a dominant role of
Dutch foreign investors, Dutch trade auctions, which dominate the export
trade, and the Dutch development cooperation, which plays an important
role in the development of the sector, a second question is to what extent
this triple role of the Dutch contributes to endogenisation or to enclave
formation.
As regards the first question we argue that endogenisation is a two-way
process. It depends on the one hand on the degree to which FDI has an
interest to enter into relationships with domestic firms and share technol-
ogies. On the other hand, it depends on domestic firms and their interest
and ability to ‘ take up’ such opportunities and on the creation of sup-
porting institutions and infrastructures to make this ‘ take-up’ possible.
The latter rests to a large extent with government while also collective
action among firms in the industry can be important here.
On the basis of the indicators summed up in Table 5, we conclude that
endogenisation is taking place to a limited extent and at a very incipient
stage. However, Dutch FDI has little direct relationship with domestic
farms in the industry and hence has little interest to share technologies.
There is joint collective action on non-core activities, notably (air and
land) transport, which constitutes the largest cost component. Dutch co-
operative flower auctions are an open and vital trade channel, giving
Ethiopian flower growers access to international markets. The Ethiopian
government has developed a pro-active policy to promote the industry,
giving tax and excise duty rebates, allowing full profit repatriation, making
land and finance available at low cost, and with the assistance of Dutch
bilateral cooperation it is actively promoting trade standards and creation
of supporting knowledge institutions to train skilled staff. The main
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challenge is Ethiopian entrepreneurship. Many are attracted by the high
growth and profitability of the industry, and have general competence to
run a successful business in Ethiopia (by no means a sinecure), but lack the
technical competence to meet growing competition in the industry, which
is central to creating dynamic competitive advantage.
As regards the second question, we conclude that the triple role of the
Dutch in Ethiopian floriculture goes beyond enclave formation, and is
helping to create a win-win situation for both countries. Ethiopia benefits,
since the Dutch help to establish a new export industry which generates
considerable employment and foreign exchange, but at the same time the
Dutch benefit from the three roles : along with the prosperity for the Dutch
FDI, the Dutch are building a sustainable, high-quality, supply base for
their world-leading flower auctions.
N O T E S
1. The main varieties of summer flowers that are produced in Ethiopia for export purpose include
hypercium, erigrinium, gypsophilia and carnation.
2. Following interviews held in Addis during August 2007, a representative sample was developed
for the study that embraced Dutch FDI and domestic firms in the floriculture sector of Ethiopia.
Twenty-six domestic firms and thirteen Dutch FDI have been engaged in the sector. From those, eight
domestic producers and four Dutch FDI were selected based on year of establishment, size of firm and
accessibility. During fieldwork we only managed to interview two Dutch FDI due to the difficulties in
reaching them; domestic producers were interviewed as planned. Next to interviewing, visits were paid
to two Ethiopian and one Dutch farm. With the guidance of results from the interviews, the most
important firm trading most Ethiopian flowers produced by domestic firms was interviewed. The main
marketplace for Ethiopian flowers, VBA, the Dutch auction in Aalsmeer, was visited. Concerned
individuals and institutions were interviewed in both Ethiopia and The Netherlands, including: a
representative of VBA in Ethiopia; the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE), which is the main
finance provider to the sector; the special advisor for the sector in the Ministry of Trade and Industry
(MOTI) of Ethiopia; the National Bank of Ethiopia; the producers’ association of the sector; and
Ethio-Horti-Share Company (EHSC). To collect data related to the role of the Dutch regarding
development cooperation and other aspects in the sector, interviews were conducted with the agri-
culture counsellor assigned in the Dutch embassy in Ethiopia, the PSOM officer for Ethiopia, the
former Dutch vice-ambassador in Ethiopia, the PUM officer for Ethiopia, and an expatriate training
specialist.
3. This is a semi-ripe flower stem which is exported before it is fully grown.
4. According to the strategic development plan of the sector, the production coverage is predicted
to reach 2,000 hectares in 2009/10 ( Joosten 2007; MOTI 2007).
5. Interview, Dutch grower.
6. The relative importance of these ‘push factors ’ could not be established within this research.
7. Local environmentalists claim that PSOM’s approach towards processing applications in relation
to corporate social responsibilities does not consult local stakeholders, and that there is no trans-
parency as to how monitoring and evaluation is taking place (IUCN NL & Both ENDS 2007). The
PSOM officer responded in an interview that the programme closely monitors and evaluates the above
aspects : ‘we know that there are watchdogs, they always bark anyway’ (interview). He added that local
concerned entities do not have clear rules to be followed. PSOM found it difficult to work with local
communities due to language and other practical barriers.
8. The complete details of the agreement between the government of Ethiopia and Sher-Holland
could not be established.
9. According to Mulu 2008, 96% of domestic firms buy licensed material and pay royalties.
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10. The transport company in Ethiopia was established with a grant from PSOM as a joint venture
of J. van de Put, two domestic companies, and another Dutch company (FloraHolland). The joint
venture gives logistics services for perishables. The domestic producers who participate in the Sher-
Ethiopia project use the logistic services in The Netherlands provided by Sher-Holland.
11. A more recent survey (Mulu 2008) estimates transport and marketing to be a much smaller
percentage of total costs (40.5%).
12. According to Mulu 2008, the auctioneer contact is the most important source of marketing
information for 54% of the domestic firms; only 20% of the foreign firms operating in Ethiopia
depend on auctions as their major source of marketing information.
13. The exception is a grower who has several years of experience in the Kenyan flower sector.
14. The Customs Authority data presented in Table 4 is not fully consistent with the data obtained
from MOTI. For example, according to MOTI the number of exporters in 2007 was 64, whereas
Table 4 shows 86; some of these companies and individuals appear irregularly in the list of exporters of
ECA. It would seem that the number of exporters in 2006/7 (86) is inflated. This may be due to double
counting of single companies with different names.
15. The balance is constituted by joint ventures.
16. This concerns the price f.o.b. Addis Ababa, that is auction price less transport and marketing
fees.
17. According to a 2008 survey (Mulu 2008), there has been increased local sourcing. For example,
local sourcing of planting material rose from 16.1% in 2005 to 50.3% in 2007. In the same period local
sourcing rose from 9.7% to 30.0% for fertiliser and from 12.4% to 33.6% for chemicals.
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